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ESSAY
THE INTERACTION OF EXHAUSTION AND THE GENERAL
LAW: A REPLY TO DUFFY AND HYNES
Ariel Katz, Aaron Perzanowski, and Guy A. Rub*
INTRODUCTION

I

N Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property,1 Professors John Duffy and Richard Hynes argue that exhaustion—
the doctrine that limits a patentee’s or copyright holder’s control over
goods in the stream of commerce—was created and functions to confine
Intellectual Property (“IP”) law within its own domain and prevent it
from displacing other laws. Exhaustion, in their description, sets aside a
space that other areas of the law, such as contracts and property, are left
to regulate.
Like Duffy and Hynes, we believe that the intersection of IP and
commercial law is an important topic with serious ramifications that
would benefit from more scholarly attention, so we welcome their contribution to the ongoing debate over exhaustion. It is a debate in which
the three of us have been deeply engaged, and one in which we rarely

* Ariel Katz is an Associate Professor, Innovation Chair–Electronic Commerce, Faculty of

Law, University of Toronto. Aaron Perzanowski is an Associate Professor, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. Guy A. Rub is an Associate Professor, Michael E. Moritz
College of Law, The Ohio State University. We would like to thank John Rothchild, Molly
Van Houweling, and Chris Walker for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are, of
course, our own.
1
John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2016).
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find ourselves entirely aligned.2 However, when it comes to many of
Duffy and Hynes’s fundamental insights about the relationship between
IP and other areas of law, we not only agree with each other, we also
agree with them. And we suspect most scholars engaged in the exhaustion debate would as well. Like Duffy and Hynes, the scholarly consensus acknowledges that other areas of law—most notably contracts—
have a role to play in structuring transactions even when exhaustion limits copyright and patent exclusivity. IP law does not and should not exist
in a vacuum. It must take into account the rights and obligations established under other bodies of law.
So far so good. But Duffy and Hynes make broader claims about the
origins of exhaustion and its relationship to other bodies of law. That is
where we part ways. They argue that the desire to confine IP law within
its own domain and prevent it from displacing other laws is the exclusive
explanation for both the emergence of exhaustion and its current function. In doing so they reject the idea that courts developed exhaustion in
light of long-standing common law principles. Acknowledging the
common law origins of the doctrine, they suggest, requires courts to
wield exhaustion as a bludgeon, pummeling any commercial law doctrine that stands in its way.
In this Essay, we explain why we are not persuaded. We first discuss
the role of the common law in shaping the exhaustion doctrine. We
show that the evidence Duffy and Hynes offer is inconclusive, incomplete, and at times inaccurate. Close examination of early exhaustion
cases paints a more complex picture that cannot be squared with the idea
that exhaustion was created independently of common law principles.
Next, we explain how Duffy and Hynes mischaracterize the prevailing
scholarly understanding of exhaustion and how the approach they advocate would strip exhaustion of any normative content. While we agree
that exhaustion draws a line between the domain of IP law and other
laws and thus prevents the former from displacing the latter, the placement of that line is far from arbitrary, and has always reflected policy
considerations. Finally, we note that Duffy and Hynes’s theory oversimplifies the relationship between IP law and state law, partly because it
does not fully consider federal preemption.
2

See, e.g., Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints,
2014 BYU L. Rev. 55, 55, 59–60 (2014); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 889, 892 (2011); Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 Emory L.J. 741, 743–44 (2015).
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I. THE COMMON LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF EXHAUSTION
Did the common law play a role in the emergence of exhaustion?
Duffy and Hynes vigorously argue it did not. But in reaching that conclusion, they largely ignore a line of early exhaustion decisions that invoke common law principles. And they struggle to square their approach
with the Supreme Court’s most recent copyright exhaustion decision—in
their own words, “one of the most important decisions on the commercial law of [intellectual property]”3—that described exhaustion as “a
common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree.”4
Duffy and Hynes insist the common law played no part in the creation
of exhaustion; the doctrine is a matter of statutory interpretation and
nothing else. Our claim is modest by comparison. We argue that the
common law did play an important role. But unlike Duffy and Hynes,
we don’t see the common law and statutory interpretation as incompatible. Courts are not forced to either faithfully interpret statutes, or alternatively exercise “a free ranging power to create federal common law.”5
We instead argue that courts rely on existing common law principles in
choosing between competing statutory interpretations. Framing the alternative as a power to fabricate federal common law conjures up an activist bogeyman when in fact, the courts that developed the principle of
exhaustion followed a well-trodden judicial path of erring on the side of
the common law.
As Duffy and Hynes point out, statutory interpretation is not confined
to the text alone.6 Courts must look to—among a range of sources—
other bodies of existing law. This is especially true when a statute is enacted against an existing body of common law. When Congress legislates in an area “previously governed by the common law,” courts must
start from the assumption “that Congress intended to retain the substance
of the common law.”7 Where the courts have already spoken, “Congress
does not write upon a clean slate.”8 If Congress wants to depart from
common law principles, the statute “must ‘speak directly’ to the ques3

Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 41.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 28.
6
Id.
7
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 n.13 (2010); see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–46 (2011); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783
(1952).
8
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
4
5
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tion.”9 That canon of construction is as old as Congress itself10 and is
still accepted today.11
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus demonstrates this point.12 There the Supreme Court had to decide whether the copyright owner’s right to
“vend” gave it control over just the first authorized sale or extended to
subsequent sales too. The Court limited the right to “vend” to the first
sale.13 Many scholars and subsequent courts explain that choice as at
least partly motivated by common law principles—in particular those
favoring the free alienability of personal property and reflecting skepticism of servitudes on chattels.14 We agree with Duffy and Hynes that the
text of the opinion does not compel that reading; the Court did not explicitly invoke the common law. But neither did it explain exhaustion as
a bulwark against copyright law encroaching upon the “commercial law
generally,” as Duffy and Hynes argue.15
As such, Bobbs-Merrill does not contradict the consensus view that
centuries-old common law principles played an important role in the
creation of exhaustion. Bobbs-Merrill might not have made the connection explicit, but when read together with other contemporaneous decisions, the link between the emergence of exhaustion and those common
law principles becomes apparent. In this short Essay we cannot explore
every contemporaneous opinion that explicitly or implicitly used com9

Id. (quoting Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 536 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797) (noting that an act “in derogation of
the common law is to be taken strictly”); Theodore Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 267 (2d ed. 1874) (“[S]tatutes are not to be
presumed to alter the common law farther than they expressly declare . . . .”). That treatise
was broadly used by courts, including the Supreme Court, including at the time in which the
principles of exhaustion were developed. See, e.g., Ca. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works, 199 U.S. 306, 324 (1905).
11
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 318
(2012) (“[S]tatutes will not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they effect the
change with clarity.”).
12
210 U.S. 339 (1908).
13
Id. at 339–40.
14
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 487, 493–94 (2011); Christina
Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 251
(2013); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property,
90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1211, 1249–52 (2015); John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking
First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 12–13 (2004);
Rub, supra note 2, at 759–62; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo.
L.J. 885, 910–14 (2008).
15
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 8.
10
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mon law principles in constructing exhaustion, but in the next few paragraphs we would like to point to a few of them.16
Consider, for example, Doan v. American Book Co.,17 one of the decades-long line of copyright exhaustion cases that culminated in BobbsMerrill. In that decision the Seventh Circuit held that a purchaser of a
book could repair and restore it notwithstanding the copyright holder’s
objections. The decision was not rooted in any statutory text, but in the
intrinsic nature of personal property rights, as the court explained: “It
would be intolerable and odious” to deny that a “right of ownership in
the book carries with it and includes the right to maintain” it.18
To take another example, the same year the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bobbs-Merrill, the Australian High Court interpreted the term
“vend” in that country’s patent statute.19 The High Court, in light of “the
recognized rule that the legislature is not to be taken to have made a
change in the fundamental principles of the common law without express and clear words announcing such an intention,” concluded that the
right to vend did “not refer to any sale of the article after it has once,
without violation of the monopoly, became part of the common stock.”20
On appeal the Privy Council reversed, focusing on the need to reconcile
the apparent inconsistency between the common law principles and the
patent statute. The U.S. Supreme Court would rely on this judgment a
year later in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,21 and courts continue to cite it, including the Federal Circuit in an important 2016 patent exhaustion decision.22
This brings us to the early twentieth century Supreme Court patent
exhaustion case law. In 1912, in Henry, the Court held that patentees
could impose restraints on downstream purchasers and that “[t]here is no
16

See also Samuel F. Ernst, Why Patent Exhaustion Should Liberate Products (And Not
Just People), Denver L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at *21–*27) (on file with authors) (noting the role of the policy against servitudes on chattels in early patent exhaustion
cases, as well as the impact of the single recovery and statutory domain theories).
17
105 F. 772 (7th Cir. 1901).
18
Id. at 777.
19
See, e.g., Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Menck (1908) 7 CLR 481 (Austl.),
rev’d in part Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Menck (1911) 12 CLR 15, 24 (Austl.)
(holding that “the general doctrine of absolute freedom of disposal” can be restricted in the
case of patented goods).
20
Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Menck (1908) 7 CLR 481, 512 (Austl.).
21
224 U.S. 1 (1912).
22
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., Nos. 2014–1617, 2014–1619, 2016 WL
559042 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2016) (en banc).
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collision between the rule against restrictions upon the alienation or use
of chattels not made under the protection of a patent and the right of the
patentee through his control over his invention.”23 Duffy and Hynes describe the disagreement between the majority and dissent in Henry as
“primarily about the scope or domain of the patent statute, not about
common law policies.”24 But, read in context, it is clear that the common
law baseline, and whether Congress intended to deviate from it, was one
of the key points of contention in a rather bitter division among the Justices.
Both the majority and the dissent in this long decision relied heavily
not just on the statutory language and existing precedent, but also on
general legal principles and on the need to promote public policy goals.
Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice White raised concerns regarding
the expansive reading of patentees’ rights. His views were partly rooted
in the common law. For example, he noted that the various forms in
which patentees purported to extend their control “tend to increase monopoly and to burden the public to the exercise of their common
rights.”25 In another place, the dissent chastised the majority for not applying the rule that the Court had set forth a year earlier in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.26 In that decision the Court—
relying explicitly and extensively on the common law aversion to restraints of trade—held that downstream control of nonpatented goods, in
the form of a retail price maintenance scheme, was invalid.27
Chief Justice White’s dissenting views prevailed five years later when
the Court explicitly reversed Henry.28 The same day, in Straus v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., another patent exhaustion case, the Court offered
its most explicit early reference to the common law, stating that
“[c]ourts would be perversely blind” if they failed to recognize restric23

Henry, 224 U.S. at 39.
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 23.
25
Henry, 224 U.S at 70 (White, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The term “common
rights” is synonymous with “common law rights.” See, e.g., Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 410, 437 (1838) (“[The right] exists by a common right, which means a right by common law . . . .”).
26
220 U.S. 373 (1911), cited in Henry, 224 U.S. at 54–55 (White, C.J., dissenting).
27
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404 (citing the common law and holding that “a general restraint
upon alienation is ordinarily invalid. ‘The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents
of a right of general property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally
regarded as obnoxious to public policy.’” (quoting Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24,
39 (6th Cir. 1907)).
28
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
24
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tive patent licenses as an attempt “to sell property for a full price, and
yet to place restraints upon its further alienation, such as have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours, because obnoxious to the
public interest.”29 Lord Coke is, of course, Edward Coke, one of the
greatest common law jurists, whose opposition to restraints on trade influences exhaustion case law to this day.
A much more recent exhaustion case reinforces the point that even
when the Court is undeniably engaged in statutory interpretation, the
common law has informed its reasoning. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.,30 the question was whether the first sale doctrine embraced
the importation and resale of books manufactured and lawfully sold
abroad. Specifically, the case turned on the meaning of the phrase “lawfully made under this title.”31 Despite the clearly statutory nature of the
question, the majority described the first sale doctrine as one “with an
impeccable historic pedigree” dating back to “the early 17th century.”32
The Court relied on the fact that “[t]he common-law doctrine makes no
geographical distinctions” to bolster its statutory reading.33 And it emphasized the policy considerations disfavoring “restraints on the alienation of chattels” and embracing the “importance of leaving buyers of
goods free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods.”34 Those considerations, along with “§ 109(a)’s
language, its context, and the common-law history of the ‘first sale’ doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation.”35 The
Court thus had no trouble reconciling the common law with statutory interpretation.
The Court’s approach in Kirtsaeng thus strongly reinforces our views
and the consensus among scholars that the common law played a role in
the development of exhaustion and thus challenges Duffy and Hynes’s
rejection of that consensus. In discussing Kirtsaeng, Duffy and Hynes
are forced to concede that the court was invoking a “‘canon of statutory
interpretation’ disfavoring expansive readings of statutes that ‘invade the
common law.’”36 We are, however, unsure how that acknowledgement
29

243 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1917) (emphasis added).
133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
32
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1358 (emphasis omitted).
36
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 51 (quoting Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363).
30
31
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squares with their overall rejection of the consensus approach. In other
words, we are puzzled by Duffy and Hynes’s failure to consider that
other decisions, including those that established the core of IP exhaustion doctrine, were similarly relying on this centuries-old canon of interpretation.37
Duffy and Hynes make another claim to support their account of the
emergence of exhaustion. They note that a number of early exhaustion
decisions “disclaim any attempt to adjudicate the relief plaintiffs might
obtain outside of IP law”38 and argue that “[s]uch agnosticism about ultimate results would be difficult to explain if the Court were engaged in
pure policymaking directed toward substantive goals.”39 For example, in
Bobbs-Merrill, the Court noted there was no contract claim before it.40
Similarly, in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., the Court noted that whether the patentee can restrict the buyer
“by special contract between the owner of the patent and a purchaser or
licensee is a question outside the patent law and with it we are not here
concerned.”41
We are unpersuaded that the courts were agnostic to the consequences
or substance of post-sale restraints, and that their only concern was ensuring the correct legal form and forum for implementing them. We disagree with Duffy and Hynes for two reasons. First, reading the Court’s
unsurprising failure to decide an issue that was not properly before it as
a disavowal of the common law and other policy considerations is a leap
we are unwilling to take. Second, a close examination of contemporaneous decisions reveals statements that are inconsistent with the agnosticism hypothesis. Rather than conveying agnosticism, those courts objected to certain contracts on substantive policy grounds and expressed
skepticism as to their enforcement as a matter of general commercial
law. For example, Chief Justice White, in his dissent in Henry, recog37

See supra note 13.
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 8.
39
Id. at 12.
40
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 346.
41
243 U.S. 502, 509 (1917). It should be noted that later in the opinion the Court expressed deep concerns with legal mechanisms that allow patentees to exercise control over
downstream usage, stating that “[t]he perfect instrument of favoritism and oppression which
such a system of doing business, if valid, would put into the control of the owner of such a
patent should make courts astute, if need be, to defeat its operation.” Id. at 515 (emphasis
added). While the Court does not explicitly state that its concerns extend beyond a patent
cause of action, we believe that if the Court were truly agnostic with respect to enforcing
post-sale restrictions through contract law, it would not have used such strong language.
38
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nized that the validity of contractual post-sale restrictions ought to be
governed by contract law. However, he noted that if not for the majority
opinion, those contracts would be void as against public policy, asking
rhetorically: “Who . . . can put a limit upon the extent of monopoly and
wrongful restriction which will arise, especially if by such a power a
contract which otherwise would be void as against public policy may be
successfully maintained?”42 That majority opinion was, as we already
noted, short lived.
In Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., Chief Justice White, now writing for the majority, continued to express skepticism as to whether post-sale restrictions are enforceable under “general
law.”43 He explored the Court’s recent case law and concluded that
[a]pplying the cases thus reviewed there can be no doubt that the alleged price-fixing contract disclosed in the certificate was contrary to
the general law and void. There can be equally no doubt that the power to make it in derogation of the general law was not within the monopoly conferred by the patent law . . . .44

This statement, we believe, plainly indicates that the Court was not agnostic to the possibility of enforcing post-sale restrictions via contracts,
as it perceived the contracts at issue as void under general law. Moreover, in relying on its recent case law—which included numerous IP exhaustion cases as well as Dr. Miles, which deals with nonpatented products—to reach this result, the Court indicated that it did not consider the
rights under IP law and the rights under general law as completely separated, as Duffy and Hynes argue,45 but as highly related.46 As we further
discuss below, the interaction between these two bodies of law is indeed
complex.
In short, the arguments raised by Duffy and Hynes do not convince us
that courts ignored well-established common law principles while developing exhaustion. We remain persuaded that the history of exhaustion
42

Henry, 224 U.S at 70–71 (emphasis added).
246 U.S. 8, 20 (1918).
44
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
45
Cf. Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that the Boston Store Court “distinguishes between issues within the patent domain from those governed by “the general law );
id. at 28 (“[I]n creating the exhaustion doctrine, the Supreme Court did sharply distinguish
statutory issues under federal IP laws from common law issues concerning contract and
property.”).
46
See also Boston Store, 246 U.S. at 20–21, 27.
43
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shows that those principles played—and continue to play—a role in
shaping the doctrine. Likewise, we reject their assertion that the courts
showed no interest in public policy and specifically that the courts’ concern about post-sale restraints had nothing to do with the substance of
those restraints.
II. THE NORMATIVE IMPACT OF STATUTORY DOMAIN
Duffy and Hynes view exhaustion as exclusively a matter of statutory
domain. That claim plays a dual role in their analysis. First, it contrasts
their theory with what they describe as the prevailing wisdom about exhaustion’s relationship to other areas of law. But as we will describe, in
drawing that distinction, Duffy and Hynes mischaracterize much of the
prior exhaustion scholarship. Second, it restricts the ability of courts to
consider broader policy goals, reducing the judicial function to identifying largely arbitrary triggers for exhaustion and stripping the doctrine of
much of its normative content.
The consensus view among modern commentators, Duffy and Hynes
suggest, leads to IP doctrine running roughshod over distinct bodies of
law like contract and property. Exhaustion, they argue, is required to
preserve these other areas of law undisturbed. Modern commentators,
they say, hold very different beliefs. Skeptics of exhaustion want “complete freedom to contract around exhaustion.”47 And exhaustion proponents see the doctrine as a “free ranging power”48 to “allow or forbid a
particular transaction.”49 Many scholars, they tell us, “want the courts to
forbid any circumvention[s]” of exhaustion.50 Later, they claim that
many of those same scholars view leases as “unjustified circumventions
of the exhaustion doctrine.”51 But they fail to cite any scholars who actually espouse these categorical views.
We do not think this characterization reflects the majority of scholarship on exhaustion. It certainly does not reflect our views. We believe
that even if exhaustion applies, a valid agreement may often give rise to
a claim of breach and contractual remedies.52 Similarly, we believe that
47

Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 28.
49
Id. at 9.
50
Id. at 10.
51
Id. at 54.
52
See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 904–05, Rub, supra note 2, at 809–12.
See also Ariel Katz, The Economic Rationale of Exhaustion: Distribution and Post-Sale Re48
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exhaustion does not forbid rights holders from offering products through
genuine leases, rentals, or subscriptions.53 Of course, not all attempts at
licensing or contracting around exhaustion will succeed. In some instances they might be preempted or invalid for violating public policy, a
decision that might be partly guided by some of the same policies that
informed the development of exhaustion. But it is not our position, nor,
we believe, the position of most modern commentators, that exhaustion
necessarily or routinely undermines general commercial law. The contention that contract and property law can coexist with exhaustion is entirely consistent with the prevailing wisdom.
That is not to say that the argument put forward by Duffy and Hynes
is without consequences. If courts adopt the view advocated by Duffy
and Hynes, it would significantly limit the tools at their disposal for resolving pressing questions about the scope of exhaustion. Duffy and
Hynes claim that exhaustion draws a formal line between what is regulated by IP law and what is not. As they admit, “formalist boundary lines
are inherently arbitrary.”54 As a result, their theory urges courts to ignore
the impact of exhaustion on other policy goals. We find this outcome inconsistent with well-established practices, difficult to sustain, and undesirable.
Consider, for example, two contemporary exhaustion questions: the
choice between international and national exhaustion and the applicability of the doctrine to digital distribution. As a matter of copyright law,
the Supreme Court resolved the first of these questions when it adopted
international exhaustion in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.55 and Kirtsaeng.56 Most commentators agree
that the text of the Copyright Act provides plausible arguments both for
and against international exhaustion. The Court’s choice between them
straints, in Research Handbook on IP Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., Edward Elgar 2016) (suggesting that the common law doctrine of restraint of
trade could evolve to distinguish between valid and invalid contracting around exhaustion);
Katz, supra note 2, at 90–100 (proposing some parameters to distinguish between valid and
invalid instances of contracting around exhaustion).
53
See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 904 (“Copyright owners committed to
price discrimination can avoid [exhaustion] by structuring transactions not as sales but as
leases or subscription services.”). This does not mean, however, that right holders should be
able to avoid exhaustion by merely labeling a sale or other transfer of ownership a “license.”
Rub, supra note 2, at 814–16.
54
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 36.
55
523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
56
133 S. Ct. at 1359.
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was not limited to a narrow examination of the Act; it also considered
broader policy questions, including access to creative works,57 “competition, including freedom to resell,”58 judicial administrability,59 and
“basic constitutional copyright objectives.”60
The Federal Circuit recently provided a different answer to that question when it affirmed national patent exhaustion in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc.61 Granted, both the majority and
the dissent partly based their decisions on the language and the structure
of the Patent Act, as compared to Kirtsaeng’s interpretation of the Copyright Act. However, both the majority and the dissent extensively addressed policy concerns. They analyzed how national and international
exhaustion would affect certainty in the market, allow patentees to recoup their investments through price discrimination, might foster perpetual control over downstream distribution, and more.62 Therefore, the
Lexmark majority and dissent, like the Kirtsaeng majority and dissent,
agree with the scholarly consensus that policy considerations play a vital
role in interpreting and shaping exhaustion.
Digital distribution provides another example of the difficulty in understanding exhaustion as an “inherently arbitrary” line between IP law
and general law, as Duffy and Hynes maintain,63 because this view limits the ability of courts to adjust the scope of exhaustion over time and in
response to changing conditions. The primary reason for the recent at-

57

Quality King, 523 U.S. at 151 (noting, for example, that the plaintiff’s position in that
case, promoting national exhaustion, “would merely inhibit access to ideas without any
countervailing benefit”).
58
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363.
59
Id. (noting the “burden of trying to enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily
movable goods”).
60
Id. at 1364–65 (noting the impact of national exhaustion on libraries and museums).
61
Nos. 2014–1617, 2014–1619, 2016 WL 559042 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2016) (en banc).
62
See, e.g., id. at *18–19 (discussing how patents provide “market-based reward” to the
patentee and the problem of vagueness); id. at *25 (discussing the need to “incentivize creation and disclosure”); id. at *26 (discussing the social benefits from patentee’s ability to offer a menu of products); id. at *33–34 (discussing the practical effects of national exhaustion
on the market and noting that “there is no concomitant risk of ‘perpetual downstream control’”); id. at *34–36 (discussing how exhaustion affects the patentees’ markets, income, and
costs); id. at *44–45 (comparing certain aspects of the markets for copyrighted and patented
goods and analyzing the impact of exhaustion regimes on those markets); id. at *58–59 (discussing the importance of allowing purchasers to compete, the effects of exhaustion on administrative costs, the need to allow free trade in goods embodying patented inventions, the
impact on transaction costs and prices, and the role of international trade).
63
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 36.
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tention exhaustion has received is that modern markets are increasingly
global and digital. As a result, those markets prompt questions about the
ideal scope of IP rights and their exhaustion. The ability to apply longstanding IP doctrines to new technologies and market realities—as
courts have done in various contexts64—depends on the recognition of
broader principles. Those principles cannot flout statutory directives, of
course, but they should not be ignored altogether either, when statutes
lend themselves to more than one plausible meaning.65
Admittedly, Duffy and Hynes might see the elimination of the policy
considerations as a feature, not a bug. If technological or market conditions alter the policy implications of exhaustion, they might argue that it
is the task of Congress to weigh those concerns and enact a new statute.
We agree that Congress could act, as it, from time to time, has acted.66
And once Congress acts, courts would be bound to interpret the statute
as faithfully as they can. But IP law regulates a fast moving technological world, and historically it has been the role of courts to help keep IP
law up to speed. Moreover, when it comes to exhaustion, Congress has
repeatedly signaled its acceptance of the judicial role in defining the
broad contours of the doctrine.67
The theory offered by Duffy and Hynes has two primary normative
implications. The first—that their theory avoids the trampling of commercial law by IP law—rests on a false premise. The bulk of the cases
and commentary reveal that the IP-domination Duffy and Hynes fear is
more specter than reality. The second implication—that courts should
ignore policy considerations in favor of focusing solely on the statutory
text—unnecessarily ties the hands of courts applying the exhaustion
doctrine, even when no conflict between IP and commercial law is at
64

There are numerous decisions that demonstrate this phenomenon. See, e.g., Am. Broad.
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (applying public performance policy to
online streaming); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying fair use to a mass digitalization project); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com., 508 F.3d
1146, 1155–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying fair use to an online search engine).
65
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in
light of this basic purpose.”).
66
See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237.
67
In 1909, Congress had “no intention [of] enlarg[ing] in any way the construction to be
given to the word ‘vend.’” H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 19 (1909). In 1976, Congress affirmed
its intent to “restate[ ] and confirm[ ]” the first sale rule “established by the court decisions.”
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693.
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stake. Below, we explore a final question left unresolved by Duffy and
Hynes’s discussion on the interaction between exhaustion and commercial law—the role of preemption.
III. EXHAUSTION AND STATE LAW: THE PREEMPTION PROBLEM
Duffy and Hynes claim that non-IP law was and should be taken into
account in developing and applying exhaustion. We agree. In fact, when
courts utilized the common law to develop exhaustion, they did just that.
When Bobbs-Merrill was decided, more than forty years before the Uniform Commercial Code was created, commercial law was, in large part,
the common law. From that perspective, the stark dichotomy Duffy and
Hynes describe between “general commercial law,” which exhaustion
was designed to preserve, and “the common law,” which was allegedly
irrelevant, is more of a porous membrane. We also agree with Duffy and
Hynes that non-IP laws have a role to play even when exhaustion limits
the rights of copyright owners and patentees. That role should be considered when developing IP policy.68
Duffy and Hynes explore the interaction between exhaustion and other areas of commercial law that regulate secondary markets. This indepth analysis can lead to important normative insights regarding the desirable scope of IP rights. It is indeed vital that IP commentators
acknowledge the role of general commercial laws within IP policy. The
contribution of Duffy and Hynes will surely advance that discussion. We
want, however, to make two comments on the interaction between IP
law and general commercial law.
First, this interaction is not limited to exhaustion. IP laws incorporate—but do not define—basic commercial terms, such as sale, license,
assignment, or mortgage.69 Federal IP laws rely on state law definitions
of those terms.70 This symbiosis between federal IP law and general
commercial law cuts across many IP doctrines. Because each of those
doctrines must be developed in tandem with state commercial law, it is
68

Many have discussed the role of non-IP laws, as well as non-legal tools, in developing
IP policy. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law 23 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 464 (1998); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217, 223–24.
69
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
70
David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 17,
24–29 (1999).
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hard to see why exhaustion should be singled out as a unique doctrine
that is meant to preserve general commercial law, as Duffy and Hynes
suggest. In some respects, this makes their analysis of the role of state
law in regulating secondary markets even more valuable. It could serve
as a model to explore similar interactions with other IP law doctrines.
Second, considering the interaction between federal IP law and state
law requires a careful analysis of federal preemption, and in particular
copyright preemption. Copyright preemption is a thorn in the side of the
Duffy and Hynes theory. Exhaustion cannot be a doctrine that is purely
designed to preserve other laws, such as contract and private property, if
it might also preempt some of those other arrangements. However, federal IP law does not give state commercial law unlimited power to regulate secondary markets. While state law does generally regulate those
markets,71 the power of states to create certain legal regimes—for example, one that grants copyright owners a copyright-like exclusive right
over the resale of copyrighted works—is limited by federal preemption
law.
Duffy and Hynes make two arguments to prevent preemption from
casting a shadow over their theory. First, they suggest that because exhaustion limits the scope of the exclusive rights under federal law, then
rights created under state law to circumvent exhaustion are, by definition, not equivalent to rights under the Copyright Act, as required by
§ 301(a), its explicit preemption provision.72 Second, they argue that
“broad preemption arguments have had very little success in the
courts”73 following the Seventh Circuit decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg.74
We find both arguments problematic. The main difficulty with their
first argument is that it ignores the purpose and uniform interpretation of
§ 301(a). Limiting the scope of copyright preemption to the scope of the
exclusive rights, as suggested by Duffy and Hynes, will allow states to
interfere with federal policy in a way that is inconsistent with the pur71
And, in doing so, they take into account some of the policy considerations that are also
reflected in exhaustion doctrine. For example, the Restatement of Contracts suggests that a
contractual promise is unenforceable as a matter of state law “on grounds of public policy if
it is unreasonably in restraint of trade,” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 186 (Am. Law
Inst. 1981), a policy that, as we have seen, played a role in the development of exhaustion as
well.
72
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 73–74.
73
Id. at 74.
74
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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pose of the Act. For example, such an approach would give states carte
blanche to regulate ideas, methods, and fair uses. This approach has
been consistently rejected by courts. In fact, the Seventh Circuit rejected
it in ProCD, stating that
[o]ne function of § 301(a) is to prevent states from giving special protection to works of authorship that Congress has decided should be in
the public domain, which it can accomplish only if “subject matter of
copyright” includes all works of a type covered by sections 102 and
103, even if federal law does not afford protection to them.75

The Sixth Circuit has similarly stated that “the shadow actually cast by
the [Copyright] Act’s preemption is notably broader than the wing of its
protection.”76
The second argument, which relies on ProCD, faces two weaknesses.
First, while ProCD was adopted by several federal circuit courts, it is
not the law of the land.77 The Second Circuit, for example, refused to
endorse it,78 and the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected it.79 Second, and
more important, the argument that Duffy and Hynes make is significantly broader than the Seventh Circuit’s approach in ProCD. ProCD and its
progeny deal exclusively with contractual rights. In fact, the distinction
between property rights and contractual rights is the main rationale for
those decisions.80 Therefore, ProCD does not support the proposition
that states are free to create any property-like arrangement they please
with respect to information goods.
Again, our claim is not that IP law and policy necessarily trump any
or even most state law claims and doctrines. We, however, maintain that
courts do not and should not be categorically denied the opportunity to
75

Id. at 1453.
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 454 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United
States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997)).
77
See Guy A. Rub, Contracting Around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of
Rights in Creative Works, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 257, 258 (2011).
78
Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television, 683 F.3d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In this
case, we need not address whether preemption is precluded whenever there is a contract
claim . . . .”).
79
Wrench, 256 F.3d at 457–58 (“[W]e do not embrace the proposition that all state law
contract claims survive preemption . . . .”).
80
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (explaining that “rights created by contract” are not “equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright” because “[a] copyright
is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties;
strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’”).
76
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consider IP policy and preemption when a dispute touches on areas that
are regulated by commercial law, including secondary markets. While
commercial law should undoubtedly help shape IP law, preemption doctrine makes the relationship between exhaustion and other areas of the
law more complex than Duffy and Hynes suggest.
CONCLUSION
The three of us do not always agree on the socially desirable scope of
IP exhaustion. However, we do agree on the ways in which that scope
should ideally be set. It should explore the justifications for exhaustion,
examine how strong and applicable they are nowadays and going forward, study the effects it has on initial and secondary markets for copyrighted goods, and yes—consider other legal (as well as non-legal) ways
to regulate those markets. The various competing interests and considerations should continue to inform the evolution of the law. Duffy and
Hynes focus on one of these considerations, the role of general commercial law, and provide important insights about it. But focusing exclusively on that single consideration significantly narrows the perspective of
what exhaustion is and what it should be. We find such an approach neither consistent with a century and a half of existing law nor advisable.

